Link manager exploit?

Can you grep your access logs for link-add.php? Might reveal something.

Oh, and upgrade to 2.2.1. 2.2 has known security flaws.

Replying to JeremyVisser:

Can you grep your access logs for link-add.php? Might reveal something.

Only three instances::

access.log.2007-07-06.gz:87.126.31.177 - - [06/Jul/2007:05:24:49 -0700] "GET /cbd/wp-admin/link-add.php HTTP/1.0" 200 12447 "-" "Opera/9.01 (Windows NT 5.0; U; en)" access.log.2007-07-12.gz:87.126.31.177 - - [12/Jul/2007:06:56:22 -0700] "GET /cbd/wp-admin/link-add.php HTTP/1.0" 200 12447 "-" "Opera/9.01 (Windows NT 5.0; U; en)" access.log.2007-07-12.gz:87.126.31.177 - - [12/Jul/2007:06:56:24 -0700] "POST /cbd/wp-admin/link.php HTTP/1.0" 200 0 "http://wrecking.org/cbd/wp-admin/link-add.php" "Opera/9.01 (Windows NT 5.0; U; en)"

Oh, and upgrade to 2.2.1. 2.2 has known security flaws.

Will do.

I don't appear to be able to replicate this bug. Have you had any problems since upgrading? Otherwise, without further logs or evidence Id be tempted to close this report.

Closing as invalid for now b/c of lack of similar reports and inability to identify any likely clause.

I'm able to reproduce this. I'm getting an avalanche of blogroll link spam every night. The links appear to be pointing to other compromised wp instances.

I set up an alert so i'd get notified when my blog was compromised. The exact time was 2007/10/15T04:16-1000. The apache log fragment is as follows:

holmwood.id.au 195.5.116.246 - - [15/Oct/2007:04:06:19 -1000] "POST /~lindsay/wp
-admin/link.php HTTP/1.0" 500 1383
holmwood.id.au 195.5.116.246 - - [15/Oct/2007:04:06:21 -1000] "POST /~lindsay/wp
-admin/link.php HTTP/1.0" 302 -
holmwood.id.au 195.5.116.246 - - [15/Oct/2007:04:16:10 -1000] "POST /~lindsay/wp
-admin/link.php HTTP/1.0" 500 1383
holmwood.id.au 195.5.116.246 - - [15/Oct/2007:04:16:14 -1000] "POST /~lindsay/wp
-admin/link.php HTTP/1.0" 302 -
holmwood.id.au 195.5.116.246 - - [15/Oct/2007:04:18:24 -1000] "POST /~lindsay/wp
-admin/link.php HTTP/1.0" 500 1375
holmwood.id.au 195.5.116.246 - - [15/Oct/2007:04:18:26 -1000] "POST /~lindsay/wp
-admin/link.php HTTP/1.0" 302 -
holmwood.id.au 195.5.116.246 - - [15/Oct/2007:04:26:59 -1000] "POST /~lindsay/wp
-admin/link.php HTTP/1.0" 500 1379

I'm running a newly upgraded 2.3.

Lindsay, could you modify link.php so it dumps the contents of $_POST to the error log so we can see how the exploit is run?

Something like...

if ( 'POST' == $_SERVER['REQUEST_TYPE'] ) {
    error_log(print_r($_POST, true));
}

Then, tomorrow, take a look at your PHP error log.

Setting milestone to 2.3.1 in case we find something.

Replying to JeremyVisser:

Lindsay, could you modify link.php so it dumps the contents of $_POST to the error log so we can see how the exploit is run?

No worries. I'll post what I get tomorrow.

After playing around with it and leading down the wrong paths too many times...

Subscribers can access the add and save code branches, Neither check for valid user premissions, only that the user is logged in(handled by admin.php).

Attached a patch which throws a current_user_can() call into both branches.

If we look at the logs above
the 500 error is wp_die presenting the user with a nonce.
Then the 302 is the bot sending back the nonce and adding the link.

I cant think of anything that would fail the additional user checks.

just moved a few things around, Blank document this way if user accesses it directly.

I think each case needs the same capability check. Perhaps put one current_user_can() check at the top and die early?

Perhaps put one current_user_can() check at the top and die early?

Allright, I'll do that.

While i'm looking at it, the move case does nothing, Doesnt look to have been touched since the start of 2006.. I cant see anything in WP-admin refering to either move or deletebookmarks.

scratch that, found the deletebookmarks code, Its just move thats orphaned.

I guess we need to check all admin pages for checks on user_level.

(In [6255]) Add current_user_can() checks to link.php. Props DD32. fixes #4627

(In [6256]) Add current_user_can() checks to link.php. Props DD32. fixes #4627 for 2.3

Reopening for 2.0.12 consideration.

WP2 Link Manager Patch

Some users are reporting that this fix is not working.

http://wordpress.org/support/topic/138934

I'm not able to find the problem. Has anybody been able to reproduce the actual spam inputs?

Some users are reporting that this fix is not working.

I've posted a message into that thread for them to get in touch with me for more debugging if needed.. Unless a user has a Editor or Admin role on the blog i cant see how they're posting the spam.(If its coming via the WP admin pages that is)

hmmm, add_link()/edit_link() already did a cap check, so I think our patch didn't really change anything.

Replying to ryan:

hmmm, add_link()/edit_link() already did a cap check, so I think our patch didn't really change anything.

Agreed.

I noticed those first when I went to look at branches/2.0 From what I can tell from reading through both the ajax and non-ajax routes you need a user with manage_links to achieve adding a link.

This is beginning to feel like someone has either stolen then cookies from a high level user _or_ found a way to create a high level user - I can't see any vector for that from the code reviewing I have done.

An attacker used the vulnerability described in #5367 to post spam links on my blog. Could that be it?

The discussion on the support forums at http://wordpress.org/support/topic/138934/page/2 suggests that the problems were due to public access to wp-config.php, leading to access to the database.

If someone can capture a link being added in their MySQL logs so we can start to trace where this is happening that'd be useful. Otherwise, tempted to close in a few days as a duplicate of #5367.

Closing as won't fix. No evidence presented to make us believe this wasn't due to another, resolved vulnerability.